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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to a transfer of the case by the Utah Supreme Court on 
September 12, 1988, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
This Appeal is taken pursuant to and based upon Rule 3, 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and jurisdiction is conferred 
upon the Court pursuant to S78-2-2(3) (i) Utah Code Annotated 
(1988). 
This is an appeal from a Final Order of Summary 
Judgment of the District Court, Third Judicial District, in and 
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, 
granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant upon a medical 
malpractice claim filed by Kyle Miller against Defendant. The 
date of the Summary Judgment sought to be reviewed is July 7, 
1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by the Appeal center upon whether 
or not the trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment in 
favor of Respondent where there existed material questions of 
fact with respect to including but not necessarily limited to the 
following: 
A. Did Respondent properly inform Appellant of 
the probable or possible dangers and consequences involved 
in removing a full bony impacted wisdom tooth sufficient 
that Appellant underwent said procedures with full informed 
consent? 
B. Did Respondent misrepresent his skill, 
ability and training necessary to properly diagnose and 
treat Appellant? 
C. Did Respondent commit negligence in the 
performance of his duties in connection with removing the 
bony impacted wisdom teeth of Appellant? 
D. Did Respondent commit negligence in failing 
to refer Appellant for appropriate specialized follow-up 
care in light of the circumstances known by Respondent 
following Appellant's surgery? 
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DISPOSITIVE RULES 
Subsections (c) and (f) of Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are dispositive in this matter and are, therefore, set 
out verbatim below. The entire text of Rule 56, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, is provided to the Court in the Addendum to this 
Brief. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least ten (10) days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in nature, may be rendered on the 
issues of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance 
to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions 
to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This was an action filed by Plaintiff, Kyle Miller, 
against Defendant for negligence and dental malpractice in 
connection with the extraction of wisdom teeth and follow-up 
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care. After little discovery and pursuant to motion made by 
Respondent, the trial court granted Summary Judgment in favor of 
Respondent dismissing Appellant's Complaint in its entirety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are material to a consideration of 
the questions presented upon appeal: 
1. In April, 1983, Appellant consulted Respondent for 
routine dental work. Appellant was not experiencing difficulty 
with his wisdom teeth, but upon Respondent's recommendation 
agreed to the extraction of three wisdom teeth known as teeth 
numbers 16, 17 and 32. 
2. On April 7, 1983, Appellants tooth number 16 was 
extracted by Respondent without incident. 
3. On April 20, 1983, Respondent extracted tooth 
number 17 and tooth number 32. Both teeth were described as 
"full bony impacted.11 
4. At some point during the extraction of teeth 
numbers 17 and 32, Appellants lingual nerve was severed resulting 
in Appellants suffering numbness and paralysis of the left 
anterior two-thirds (2/3) of the tongue and lack of sensation in 
the floor of the mouth. 
5. Respondent failed to inform Appellant of the 
probable or possible dangers and consequences involved in 
removing a full bony impacted wisdom tooth prior to performing 
said procedure. 
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6. Had Appellant been informed of the probable or 
possible dangers and consequences involved in removing a full 
bony impacted wisdom tooth, he would not have consented to such a 
procedure being performed by Respondent. 
7. Respondent failed to refer Appellant for 
appropriate specialized follow-up care for a period in excess of 
twenty-four (24) months following the procedure and injury to 
Appellant. 
8. After completing appropriate pre-litigation 
procedures, Appellant filed a Complaint alleging breach of duty 
and negligence against Respondent which Complaint was filed in 
September of 1987. 
9. In June of 1988, after little discovery and 
pursuant to motion made by Respondent, the trial court granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of Respondent dismissing Appellant's 
Complaint in its entirety. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Summary Judgment should not have been granted by 
the court below where Affidavits filed with the Court clearly 
raised material issues of fact. 
2. The court below should have in any event granted 
Appellant the right for additional time to complete discovery or 
obtain expert testimony, if necessary. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NEITHER PROPER NOR JUSTIFIED 
IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The granting of a Motion for summary Judgment is 
justified only when "it serves the salutary purpose of 
eliminating the time, trouble and expense of a trial which would 
be to no avail anyway." Summary judgment however, is not 
justified where there does exist genuine issues of material fact 
to be decided. It is well established in Utah that: 
Summary judgment is proper only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions 
show that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to the 
judgment as a matter of law. If there is any doubt 
or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing 
party. Thus, the court must evaluate all the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. [Emphasis added] 
Bowen v. Riverton City, Utah, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (1982), as quoted 
in Frisbee v. K & K Construction Company, Utah, 676 P. 2d 387 
(1984). See also Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Utah Supreme Court has gone even further to 
indicate that the granting of a motion for summary judgment is a 
harsh remedy and that the sole purpose of summary judgment is to 
bar from the courts unnecessary and unjustified litigation and 
only where it clearly appears that the party against whom the 
judgment would be granted cannot possibly establish a right to 
recover should such a judgment be granted. Any doubt should be 
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resolved in favor of such party when summary judgment against him 
is being considered. See Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity 
and Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, 16 U.(2d) 211, 398 P.2d 685 
(1965). It is against this long-standing backdrop that this 
Court should consider the issues presented on appeal in this 
matter. 
A. Plaintiff's Affidavit, filed in the Court 
below, clearly raised material issues of fact sufficient to 
require the District Court to deny Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
The Affidavit of Kyle Miller filed in the Court 
below (attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit "1") , 
clearly raised critical issues of fact which required the 
denial of Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. More 
specifically, the attachment to that Affidavit, which was 
made a part thereof, contained a letter from an oral surgeon 
by the name of Dr. Blaine D. Austin. Among other things, 
Dr. Austin's letter clearly stated that "lingual nerve 
parathesia . . . is a report complication of mandibular 
third molar removal." Dr. Austin's letter also stated, 
"that as a complication this is something that has been 
indicated in the Oral Surgery Literature." As such, Dr. 
Austin's letter clearly raised an issue as to the standard 
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in the community that a proper practice for the dentist 
involved in this matter would be to disclose such a risk to 
a patient. 
Dr. Austin, as a respected oral surgeon in the 
Salt Lake community, also indicated in his letter that, "I 
believe that it is common that most impacted wisdom teeth 
are removed by Oral Surgeons" thereby raising the issue 
complained of by Mr. Miller in his Complaint and his 
Affidavit that Dr. Lofthouse should have referred him, under 
the circumstances, for such specialized care. 
Likewise, Dr. Austin in his letter made a part of 
Kyle Miller's Affidavit stated that " . . . being that this 
was a late date for his injury that the best result would 
have been obtained, had some type of definitive treatment 
been initiated within the first six months to a year, as 
this usually provides the best result." Dr. Austin's 
statement in this regard also raised a material issue of 
fact as to the proper follow-up care which Dr. Lofthouse 
failed to render in this matter. 
Each of these issues raised by Dr. Austin in the 
attachment to Kyle Miller's Affidavit consisted of medical 
opinion produced by Appellant in the lower Court in 
opposition to the medical testimony presented by Respondent 
before Judge Moffat contrary to the representations made by 
Respondent in his Memorandum in support of his Motion for 
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Summary Disposition. Each likewise supported the Complaint 
allegations of negligence against Dr. Lofthouse with expert 
medical testimony consistent with and as required by Rule 56 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The courts have traditionally denied summary 
judgment motions in medical malpractice and negligence cases 
where any genuine fact issue exists. The reason for this 
rule was succinctly stated by two experts as follows: 
To arbitrarily decide a genuine fact 
issue under the guise of summary judgment is, 
of course, a serious deprivation of the 
fundamental right of trial. 
Medical Malpractice, Vol. 1, Louisell & Williams, Para. 
12.13 (1988) . 
The argument of Respondent in the court below and 
theoretically before this Court appears to be that the 
medical testimony of Dr. Austin which was made a part of 
Kyle Miller7s Affidavit in the court below, did not go far 
enough. Our Utah Supreme Court has, however, made it clear 
that it is the duty of the Court to " . . . evaluate all the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing 
Summary Judgment . . " at such time as it makes its 
decision. See Frisbee v. K & K Construction Company, Utah, 
676 P.2d 387 (1984). Further, 
It is said that because of the 
drastic potentials of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it is almost universal practice to 
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scrutinize with care and particularity the 
Affidavits of the moving party while indulging 
in some leniency with respect to the 
Affidavits of the opposition. It has been 
held that upon a motion for summary judgment, 
the court must be critical of the moving 
papers but not those in opposition. 
73 American Jurisprudence 2nd, Summary Judgment, § 37, 
P. 764. (Citations omitted). 
Defendant Dr. Lofthouse in the court below, by 
failing to move to strike or otherwise object to Plaintiff's 
Affidavit and its attachment filed in opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment, waived his right to contest the 
Affidavit with its attachments. See Fox v. Allstate 
Insurance Company, 22 U.(2d) 383, 453 P.2d 701 (1969). As 
such, Dr. Austin's statements were admissible for purposes 
of constituting expert medical testimony in opposition to 
the medical testimony produced by Respondent in favor of his 
Motion for Summary Judgment below. 
Respondent, in his Memorandum in support of his 
Motion for Summary Disposition filed earlier with this 
Court, cited the case of Robinson v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 762 (Ct. of App. of Utah, 1987) decided 
by this Court, in support of his contention that some 
medical testimony is necessary to establish the standard of 
care applicable in a medical malpractice case. Not only did 
Plaintiff do so in the case at bar, but in the Robinson 
case, this Court made it clear in its decision that Mrs. 
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Robinson did not file any affidavits in support of her 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Robinson, 
supra., at page 264. Such is not the circumstance of the 
case at bar. Likewise, even in the Robinson case, the court 
below granted Robinson thirty (3 0) days to provide an expert 
witness to establish her theory of negligence. This was in 
part done because, in the Robinson case, other possible 
sources of the injury were set forth and in part because 
Mrs. Robinson argued that, even if she did have to produce 
expert testimony on this point, she did not have to do so 
before trial. Such is not the case at issue here as 
Appellant Kyle Miller clearly produced expert medical 
testimony in opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and said Appellant, by Affidavit, clearly indicated 
that he would be relying at trial on the testimony of Dr. 
Robert L. Pekarsky to establish the breach of standard of 
care of the Defendant. 
In light of the fact that there were raised and 
remain material issues of fact to be determined with respect 
to the questions of informed consent, negligence by 
Dr. Lofthouse in removing Kyle Miller's wisdom tooth, and 
follow-up care rendered (or not rendered) by Dr. Lofthouse, 
the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Respondent and that Order of the District Court 
should be reversed. 
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B. Rule 56(f) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
affords Appellant the right for additional time to complete 
discovery or obtain expert testimony, if necessary. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows: 
Should it appear from the Affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opposition, the court 
may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
Should this Court decide that the Affidavit of 
Kyle Miller filed in the court below, together with its 
attachment, did not establish material issues of fact with 
respect to the standard of care and the treatment provided 
by Respondent Dr. Lofthouse thereunder, said affidavit did 
meet the requirements of Rule 56(f) in every respect. As 
such, the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Plaintiff additional time to complete discovery including 
but not limited to the obtaining of the deposition and/or a 
sworn statement of Plaintiff's expert. 
Paragraph 7 of Kyle Miller's Affidavit states 
that, 
The Plaintiff intends to rely at 
trial on the testimony of Dr. Robert L. 
Pekarsky to establish the breach of standard 
of care by the Defendant. The Plaintiff has 
12 
not obtained a written report from Dr. 
Pekarsky at this time and Dr. Pekarsky's 
deposition has not yet been taken. 
Such a statement clearly raised the issues addressed in Rule 
56(f) and was sufficient to call upon the Court to allow 
Plaintiff additional time to complete discovery and obtain 
medical expert opinion should the Court have felt that the 
same was necessary to dispute Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
The question of additional time was addressed by 
Mr. Brown, attorney for Plaintiff, in the court below and 
was considered by Judge Moffat. Judge Moffat chose, 
however, to deny Plaintiff additional time to complete 
discovery or obtain additional expert opinion from 
Dr. Pekarsky or others. (See Affidavit of C. Reed Brown 
which is included in the Addendum hereto, marked Exhibit "2" 
which was also included with Appellant's earlier Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion for Summary Disposition.) In doing 
so, the Court abused its discretion. 
As pointed out hereinabove, Respondent, in his 
Memorandum in support of his Motion for Summary Disposition 
filed earlier with the Court, cited the case of Robinson v. 
jjitermountain Health Care, Inc., supra. In the Robinson 
case, however, this Court specifically recognized the 
application of Rule 56(f) and clearly noted that the lower 
court in the Robinson case initially denied a motion for 
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summary judgment made by the defendant doctor and allowed 
the plaintiff thirty (30) additional days to obtain expert 
testimony in opposition thereto. It was only after 
plaintiff in the Robinson case failed to obtain additional 
expert testimony that the district court granted the summary 
judgment requested by the defendant in that case. 
There need be no formal written motion presented 
to the court to obtain additional time for discovery under 
the terms of Rule 56(f). No such requirement exists. On 
the contrary, the court is given the power to allow a 
plaintiff under such circumstances additional time to 
complete discovery and, as has long been recognized, is 
encouraged to do so. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
identical to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In explaining the substance and purpose for the 
Rule, the Federal court has stated the following: 
Rule 56(f) permits a party opposing 
a summary judgment motion to file affidavits 
stating why he is unable to present by 
affidavit facts justifying his opposition; 
Rule 56(e) provides the form of affidavits. 
When the requirements of Rule 56(f) are met, 
the court may deny the summary judgment 
motion, permit a continuance, order more 
discovery or make any order which is fair, 
[emphasis added] 
Whitaker v. Department of Human Resources, 86 F.R.D. 689, 
691 (1980). 
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The Utah Court of Appeals, as evidenced by the 
Robinson case, supra., and others, has long agreed with the 
foregoing standard in the case of a motion made for summary 
judgment. This Utah Court, in the case of Hoopiiaina v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (Ct. of App. of 
Utah, 1987), recognized the proper denial of a motion for 
summary judgment twice based upon the representation of the 
Plaintiff that he was attempting to obtain expert testimony 
and would have an expert before trial. See Hoopiiaina, 
supra., at P. 271. As such, Judge Moffat in the court below 
should have in any event granted Plaintiff additional time 
to obtain the written opinion and/or take the deposition of 
Dr. Pekarsky in order to allow Plaintiff to have filed an 
affidavit setting out facts essential to justify opposition 
to Defendant's Motion. 
In light of the foregoing, the Trial Court clearly 
should have granted Appellant relief pursuant to Rule 56(f) 
in order to allow additional and/or the completion of 
discovery and to obtain the deposition and/or sworn 
statement of Plaintiff's medical expert in opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court clearly erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Respondent in the court below where genuine 
and material issues of fact were raised and remain for decision 
by a trier of fact. In the event that the trial court decided 
that Plaintiff had not raised material issues of fact in 
opposition to Defendant's Motion below, the trial court erred in 
not applying the standards of Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure in granting Plaintiff additional time to complete 
discovery and obtain the necessary expert medical testimony to 
contradict the Affidavit filed by Defendant in support of his 
motion. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully prays that this Court 
reverse the Summary Judgment granted by the trial court and 
remand allowing additional discovery to be completed and the 
matter to proceed through a trial before a trier of fact. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of January, 1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following on the 19th day of January, 1989: 
David H. Epperson, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 




EXHIBIT " 1 " 
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C. REED BROWN, P.C. [A0446] 
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3450 Highland Drive, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-7632 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYLE MILLER, ) 
Plaintiff, ) AFFIDAVIT OF KYLE MILLER 
vs. ) 
LARRY D. LOFTHOUSE, D.D.S., ) 
) Civil No. C87-6056 
Defendant. ) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW Kyle Miller and being first duly sworn 
upon oath deposes and says: 
1. That is the plaintiff above named and most 
knowledgeable to make this affidavit. 
2. That the defendant never explained to him the 
risks of lingual nerve parasthesia which is a known complica-
tion of extraction of Tooth No. 17. 
3. Plaintiff never signed a consent for extraction 
of Tooth No. 17 that contained any warning about lingual nerve 
parasthesia. 
4. Plaintiff was never informed by defendant that 
extractions of this type are normally performed by oral 
surgeons and not by general dentists. 
5. The medical report of Dr. Blaine D. Austin 
D.D.S./Oral Surgeon dated January 23, 1987 attached as Exhibit 
"A" indicates that oral surgeons generally perform this type 
of surgery and not general dentists. Dr. Austin also 
indicates that lingual nerve parasthesia is a "report 
complication of mandibular third molar removal". 
6. The medical report referred to in defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment provided by Dr. Moszary was not 
obtained for litigation purposes and does not address the 
issue of Dr. Lofthousefs medical negligence. 
7. The plaintiff intends to rely at trial on the 
testimony of Dr. Robert L. Pekarsky to establish the breach of 
standard of care by the defendant. The plaintiff has not 
obtained a written report from Dr. Pekarsky at this time and 
Dr. Pekarskyfs deposition has not yet been taken. 
DATED this day of June, 1988. 
KYLE MILLER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
June, 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires* Residing in Salt Lake County, UT 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Affidavit of Kyle Miller was hand delivered this 2nd 
day of June, 1988, to the following: 
David H, Epperson, Esq, 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 South West Temple, #650 






445 east 4500 south 
suite 175 







January 23, 1987 
Re; Kyle Miller 
To Whom It May Concern: 
At the request of Mr, Miller, I am presenting this 
letter having been asked as a second opinion for an 
evaluation for his left Lingual Paresthesia. Mr. 
Miller indicates to me that approximately three 
years ago he had a removal of a left boney impacted 
wisdom tooth and at this point in time has no resolution 
of his Lingual Paresthesia. 
Mr. Miller's consult was regarding possible follow 
up treatment for his condition. I advised him in-
itially that his best result would be for referral 
to an individual who has provided care for other 
patients with nerve paresthesia and nerve injuries 
and that there was a possibility of treatment of 
micro-neuro vascular surgery. 
In regards to this, Mr. Miller asked regarding my 
experience removing widom teeth and indicated to 
him that, I had taken out several hundred wisdom 
teeth that I personally, never had a lingual nerve 
paresthesia. Although, it is a report complication 
of mandibular third molar removal. I believe that 
it is common that most impacted wisdom teeth are 
removed by Oral Surgeons and that as a complication 
this is something that hajs been indicated in the 
Oral Surgery Literature, J l also indicated to Mr. 
Miller, that being that Cnis was a late date for 
his injury that the best result would have been 
btained, had some type of definitive treatment 
been initiated within .the first six months to a 
year, as this ususally-provides the best result. 
I hope this fulfill's Mr. Miller's desires. Tnank 
you. 
Sincerely , 
Dr. Blaine D. Austin D.D.S 
Oral Surgeon 
BP 
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John S. Adams, #A0017 
Robert M. Taylor, #3208 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 263-1112 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





LARRY D. LOFTHOUSE, D.D.S., 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
C. REED BROWN, ESQ. 
Case No. 880545-CA 
-oooOooo-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
C. Reed Brown, the below-named Affiant, having been 
placed under oath states and alleges as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah. 
2. I represented the above-named Appellant, Kyle 
Miller, in the above-referenced case before the District Court, 
the Honorable Richard Moffat presiding. 
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3. I appeared on behalf of Kyle Miller before the 
Honorable Richard Moffat at the Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on June 3, 1988 at 9:00 a.m. upon the Court's Law and 
Motion Calendar. Said proceedings were not transcribed. 
4. At the hearing upon Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, during argument and after review by the Court of the 
Affidavit submitted by Plaintiff Kyle Miller and the attachment 
thereto which included a letter dated January 23, 1987, from Dr. 
Blaine D. Austin, D.D.S., discussions were had with the Court 
about the possibility of granting Plaintiff an additional thirty 
(30) days to conduct discovery and/or otherwise obtain expert 
testimony in opposition to the Affidavit submitted by Defendant 
in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5. After discussion with the Court, the Honorable 
Judge Moffat ruled that he would not allow additional discovery 
time but would grant Defendant's Motion as prayed. 
DATED this *~}<£> day of September, 1988. 
C. Reed Brown 
RULE 56 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56, Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be acjjudged guilty of contempt. 
